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This paper analyzes the impact of rural-to-urban migration on income inequality and gender 
wage gap in source regions using a newly constructed panel dataset for around 100 villages over 
a ten-year period from 1997 to 2006 in China. Since income inequality is time-persisting, we use 
a system GMM framework to control for the lagged income inequality, in which contemporary 
emigration is also validly instrumented. We found a Kuznets (inverse U-shaped) pattern between 
migration and income inequality in the sending communities. Specifically, contemporary 
emigration increases income inequality, while lagged emigration has strong income inequality-
reducing effect in the sending villages. A 50-percent increase in the lagged emigration rate 
translates into one-sixth to one-seventh standard deviation reduction in inequality. These effects 
are robust to the different specifications and different measures of inequality. More interestingly, 
the estimated relationship between emigration and the gender wage gap also has an inverse U-
shaped pattern. Emigration tends to increase the gender wage gap initially, and then tends to 
decrease it in the sending villages. 
 


















The Human Development Research Paper (HDRP) Series is a medium for sharing recent 
research commissioned to inform the global Human Development Report, which is published 
annually, and further research in the field of human development. The HDRP Series is a quick-
disseminating, informal publication whose titles could subsequently be revised for publication as 
articles in professional journals or chapters in books. The authors include leading academics and 
practitioners from around the world, as well as UNDP researchers. The findings, interpretations 
and conclusions are strictly those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of 
UNDP or United Nations Member States. Moreover, the data may not be consistent with that 
presented in Human Development Reports.   1
1.  Introduction 
Inequality is closely and reciprocally intertwined with migration. On the one hand, income 
inequality between source and destination areas is widely believed to be one of the most 
important factors that drive economic migration. This is inherent in the Lewis model of dual 
economy and made more explicit in the Harris-Todaro model of rural–urban migration (J. R. 
Harris and M. P. Todaro, 1970; W. A. Lewis, 1954). Internal rural–urban migration is modeled 
as a response to the wage disparities between the urban and rural sectors (D. Ray, 1998).
1 By the 
same token, international migration can be viewed as an outcome of global inequality (R. Black 
et al., 2005). Large and increasing wage gaps across countries are cited as an irresistible force 
impelling greater labor mobility across national boundaries (L. Pritchett, 2006).  
 
  The growth of the literature on the New Economics of Labour Migration has brought 
about focus on the inequality within sending communities as drivers of migration: the 
household's relative position with respect to a specific reference group in addition to the 
household's absolute income serves as strong motivation for migration (O. Stark and J. E. Taylor, 
1991, Oded Stark and David E. Bloom, 1985). Conversely, labor mobility generates a feedback 
effect on income inequality in both sending and receiving communities. In fact, one of the 
controversial arguments put forward to control international migration is that immigrants 
increase income inequality in the receiving countries because the influx of low-skilled 
immigrants suppresses the wage of the locals at the end of the skill distribution. However, more 
recent items of evidence have suggested that only 5-10 percent of wage inequalities can be 
attributed to immigration in the United States between 1980 and 2000, much smaller than is 
commonly presumed (David Card, 2009; C. D. Goldin and L. F. Katz, 2008).  
 
  This paper examines the impact of migration on inequality in the sending communities. 
The evidence presented is mixed. It depends on the structural factors that affect the distribution 
of the costs and benefits of migration and the associated selectivity of migration itself (R. Black, 
C. Natali and J. Skinner, 2005). If the costs of migration are sizeable and the poor face binding 
credit constraints, which is often the case in the context of developing countries, migration will 
                                                 
1 Needless to say, the inequality among the other dimensions of life opportunities, such as education, health, civil 
liberty, and other dimensions are also drivers of migration.   2
be positively selected by the poor trapped in nonproductive activities at the source communities. 
This means that the rich will benefit the most from migration because migration will widen 
rather than narrow the income gaps in the sending communities. This is indeed what earlier 
research undertakings have found (R. H. Adams, 1993, 1998; M. Lipton, 1980; O. Stark et al., 
1988).  
 
  Recent empirical works have challenged this traditional view. It is increasingly 
recognized that the impacts of migration on income inequality in the migrant sending 
communities crucially hinge on the selectivity of migration and how this selectivity changes over 
time. Although pioneer migrants may come from relatively wealthy households who can afford 
the cost of migration and have better information on urban employment, their migration is likely 
to induce more migration from people in the bottom of the income distribution for two reasons. 
First, the increase in relative deprivation among nonmigrants tends to boost their desire to 
migrate. Second, the establishment of migrant networks in the destination areas lowers the costs 
and risks of migration, which in turn facilitates more waves of migration of the poor. As a result, 
the initially negative effect of remittances on income equality might therefore be dampened or 
even reversed (H. de Haas, 2007; David McKenzie and Hillel Rapoport, 2007; Hillel Rapoport 
and Frédéric Docquier, 2005;O. Stark, J. E. Taylor and S. Yitzhaki, 1988).
2  
 
  The difference in the results may also come from the differences in the methodology. 
Earlier studies treated remittance income as an exogenous transfer, and compared Gini 
coefficients with and without the inclusion of remittance income, whereas more recently, 
remittances have been treated as a potential substitute for home earnings. In addition, the 
observed income distribution with remittances are compared to a counterfactual scenario in 
                                                 
2 Docquier et al. (2006), propose a dynamic theoretical framework that goes part of the way towards reconciling the 
conflicting results from empirical studies and complements the ”networks” view in showing that the same 
predictions may be obtained with exogenous (i.e., constant) migration costs. They investigate the impact of 
migration on income and inequality both via the direct effect of migrants’ households increase in their income via 
higher wages abroad and also the indirect effects of the outbound flow of individuals on the local labor market. They 
do so in a way that demonstrates the importance of the pre-migration distribution of wealth in determining the 
impact of migration on the dynamic path and long-run levels of income and wealth inequality. They show that 
migration and remittances always lower wealth inequality. In contrast, although income inequality is also reduced in 
the long run, it may either increase or decrease in the short run, depending on the initial distribution of endowments. 
That is to say, the short- and the long-run effects on the income distribution may be of opposite signs and display an 
inverse U-shaped relationship.   3
which no migration takes place, but includes an imputed level of home earnings (R. Black, C. 
Natali and J. Skinner, 2005; Nong Zhu and Xuebei Luo, 2008). Although the earlier approach is 
unrealistic in assuming that remittance-earning migrants are separate entities from their 
households in the rural areas and excludes their income in destination areas, the improvement 
that the counterfactual model provides is limited because the selection into migration is difficult, 
if not impossible, to model.
3 This led some researchers, after reviewing the literature, to conclude 
that any overarching generalization about impacts on inequality is unlikely to be robust (R. Black, 
C. Natali and J. Skinner, 2005).  
 
  In addition to these methodology challenges, the usefulness of earlier literature is also 
tempered by the cross-section nature and the small sample size. The lack of panel data at the 
community level seriously limits the researchers’ ability to quantify the temporal dimension of 
migration and inequality. The alleged inequality-reducing effect of migration over time remains 
elusive. Moreover, it is primarily based on anecdotes rather than evidence. Without a large 
sample of communities, previous literature focuses mainly on the examination of the effect of 
migration on inequality in only a couple of communities (see McKenzie and Rapoport 2007 for a 
detailed review). The external validity of these studies is questionable, at best. McKenzie and 
Rapoport (2007) contribute to the literature by constructing cross-section data of 57 rural 
communities from the Mexican Migration Project (MMP) survey and short panel data of 214 
rural communities in Mexico from the national demographic dynamics survey (ENADID) in 
1992 and 1997. This identification strategy essentially estimates the effect of the development on 
emigration on the change in inequality. Community-level emigration rates are instrumented by 
the historic state-level migration rates and U.S. labor market conditions to deal with the 
endogeneity of migration.  
 
  McKenzie and Rapoport (2007) find that further migration reduces inequality among 
communities with reasonably high initial levels of migration experience. Furthermore, migration 
                                                 
3 In earlier studies of this strand for example, an econometric model does not control for the selection problem 
involved in the original migration decision. The migrant and non-migrant were treated as drawn randomly from the 
population (Barham and Boucher, 1998). In Barham and Boucher (1998), they estimate individual earnings 
equations in a double-selection model involving migration choices and non-migrants' labor force participation 
decisions. However, these kinds of selection models require at least one additional exogenous instrument for each 
selection. Otherwise the identification will only come from non-linearity.    4
has positive but insignificant effects on inequality in communities with smaller migration 
networks. Employing the panel data for a sample of communities observed in 1992 and 1997, 
they find suggestive evidence for an inverse U-shaped Kuznets relationship between migration 
and inequality, with migration increasing inequality at first before subsequent migrations lower it. 
However, since they have observed the same communities only twice in time, they essentially 
use the contemporary variation across communities in migration to proximate the effect of 
changes in migration on inequality.  
 
This paper analyzes the impact of rural-to-urban migration on inequality using the panel 
data derived from around 100 villages in rural China as observed four times (1997, 2000, 2004, 
and 2006) over a ten-year period. To our best knowledge, this is the first paper that examines the 
dynamic aspects of migration and income inequality using a dynamic panel data analysis. First, 
we are able to construct a relatively long panel of variables of many communities with a range of 
different migration experiences from individual and community level panel surveys on both 
incomes and migration, which are ideal in studying the dynamics of migration and income 
inequality (David McKenzie and Hillel Rapoport, 2007). In our study, the large sample size (N) 
is critical because we exploit both cross-section and time-series variations in the panel data. The 
large N provides the precondition for the asymptotic property of linear regressions to hold. 
Furthermore, the relatively long panel allows us to examine the dynamic aspects of migration 
and income inequality using a linear dynamic panel analysis.
4 Second,  unlike earlier studies 
focusing exclusively on remittances, our data include the total labor earnings of migrants in the 
destination areas, which allow us to capture the general equilibrium effects. Third, we also look 
at the impact of migration on gender wage inequality within the sending communities, which is 
calculated from the key informant interview in the community panel survey. Last but not least, 
the massive wave of rural urban migrants in China, since its reform in 1980s, provides a unique 
context to test the relationship between migration and inequality at the community level. The 
structural barriers of integration into the urban society and the economic and psychological 
security offered by the home villages cause temporary migrants to maintain strong linkage with 
the source communities through remittances and return (R. Murphy, 2002). Therefore, the 
                                                 
4 Recall that the panel data used by McKenzie and Rapoport (2007) only observed the same villages twice, in 1992 
and 1997.   5
impacts of migration on the sending communities are more palpable than in the other contexts. 
Moreover, there are evidences to prove that selectivity for temporary migrants in particular has 
declined using the 1990 and 2000 Census data (Cindy Fan and Mingjie Sun, forthcoming). This 
decline in selectivity for temporary migrants provides suggestive evidence that migration, among 
other factors, has the potential to reduce inequalities within the sending communities in the long 
term. 
 
Since income inequality is time-persisting, we used the system GMM to control the 
lagged income inequality in estimating the effect of emigration on income inequality in the 
sending villages. At the same time, contemporary emigration is instrumented in the GMM 
framework because of the unobserved time-varying community shocks that correlate with 
emigration and income inequality, and the potential reverse causality from income inequality to 
emigration. We found a Kuznets (inverse U-shaped) pattern between migration and income 
inequality in the sending communities. Specifically, contemporary emigration increases income 
inequality, while lagged emigration has strong income inequality-reducing effect in the sending 
villages. A 50- percent increase in the lagged emigration rate translates into one-sixth to one-
seventh standard deviation reduction in inequality. Contemporary emigration has slightly smaller 
effects in raising the income inequality within villages. These effects are robust to different 
specifications and different measures of inequality. More interestingly, the estimated relationship 
between emigration and gender wage gap also has an inverse U-shape. Emigration tends to 
increase gender wage gap initially, and then decrease it in the sending villages. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 gives the background of 
the rural–urban migration in China and briefly reviews the literature on migration and inequality 
in China. Section 3 presents the empirical strategy, a linear dynamic panel data analysis. Sections 
4 and 5 describe the data and report the empirical results. Section 6 briefly discusses the 
implications and concludes the paper.   6
2.  Background: Rural–urban migration in China 
2.1 The Hukou system and its reform 
 
  Modeled  after  the  propiska system in the Soviet Union and with roots that date back to 
ancient China, the Residence Registration System (hukou) was established in 1958; it ties 
citizens to a specific location within China through residency permits (K. W. Chan and W. 
Buckingham, 2008).  The hukou  also outlines an individual’s rights to entitlements: in an 
agricultural area, the hukou entitles the holder to farmland, while a hukou in an urban area grants 
the holder access to jobs, housing, food, and other public services. The 1984 reform liberalized 
the movement of the rural poor, but without changing the hukou system; and without a local 
hukou (i.e., permanent change in residency) they are not fully entitled to social benefits (e.g., 
government housing) or public services (e.g., urban education system) or access to jobs in the 
destination areas. As in other areas of reform, the Chinese government has chosen a gradual and 
partial approach: providing labor rights but falling short of full abolishment of the hukou system. 
Analogous to the point-based system in host countries for international migrants, the hukou 
system engineered a two-tier migration scheme, whereby changes in permanent residency may 
be permitted for the highly skilled and college-educated migrant urbanites, but only temporary 
residency is usually granted for the less-skilled and less educated rural-to-urban migrants (Cindy 
Fan, 2008). 
 
  From the late 1980s to the mid-1990s, many city governments offered the “blue-stamp” 
hukou to well-off migrants who were able to make sizable investments. Training of rural–urban 
migrants is one of the foci in the early 1990s. The Migration Work Registration Card at the 
migrants’ place of hukou origin and the Employment License at the place of destination were 
created to facilitate job searching and give migrants access to employment service from 
government agencies. In 1997, the State Council approved a pilot scheme to grant urban hukou 
to rural migrants who held stable jobs and had resided in selected towns and small cities for more 
than two years (Cindy Fan, 2008). In recent years, governments have undertaken reforms to 
establish a unified hukou regime to effectively eliminate the distinction between agricultural and 
non-agricultural hukou. Experiments in 12 provinces have been underway since 2007, although 
in general, small cities and towns have liberalized faster than the big metropolitan areas where   7
barriers remain high. In 2007, the new Labor Contract Law gave migrant workers along with 
other ordinary workers better rights and greater protection in terms of entitlement to written labor 
contracts and long-term job security. In 2008, the Ministry of Human Resources and Social 
Security announced that the measures on the portable pension for migrant workers will be 
implemented by the end of 2008 (Fang Cai et al., 2009).    
 
2.2. Trends and Basic Characteristics 
 
  The upsurge in the movement since 1990s was driven by the rapid growth in 
manufacturing jobs and higher pay in the coastal areas, in addition to the above-mentioned 
liberalization in the rule and regulations. The massive wave of migration of rural laborers to 
urban centers is estimated to result in 278 million increase in the permanent urban population 
from 1979 to 2003 (Xianghu Lu and Yonggang Wang, 2006). In 1990, the intercounty floating 
population was less than two percent of the total population, rising to 6.3 percent in 2000. 
Combining intercounty and intracounty in 2000 suggests that about one in nine Chinese are 
movers, amounting to a stock of migrants of 144 million (Cindy Fan, 2008). The five-year 
interprovincial migration flows from 1995 to 2000 also trebled from 12 million to 32 million, 
most of whom are temporary migrants without hukou.
5 
 
  Figure 1 indicates that the rural-to-urban migration rate has increased dramatically from 
6.8 percent in 1997 to 22.4 percent in 2006. The characteristics of migrants are distinct from the 
general population indicating they are a selective group. Permanent migrants tend to be 
positively selected in terms of educational attainment and the selectivity has increased over time. 
Permanent migrants, most of whom are college educated, have higher occupational attainment 
and tend to be employed as professionals, managers, and government officials. In contrast, there 
is evidence that selectivity for the temporary migrants in particular has declined based on the 
1990 and 2000 Census data (Cindy Fan and Mingjie Sun, forthcoming).
 Two-thirds of both 
hukou and non-hukou interprovincial migrants fall into the age group between 20 and 39, and 
statistics show that the mean age of migrants has declined over time. Both permanent and 
                                                 
5 Fan (2008) shows that temporary migrants account for almost three quarters of all inter-county migrants from 1995 
to 2000.   8
temporary migrants are sex-selective, especially for temporary migrants with a sex ratio of 1.56 
(males/females) in 1990. However, the sex ratio of migrants has declined sharply to 1.1, 
indicating increased female participation in migration. Over 80 percent of temporary migrants 
only have junior secondary education or below, although there is sign that they are becoming 
better educated as well. Owing to their low educational attainment, it is not surprising that 
temporary migrants concentrate on industrial and commercial service occupations. This decline 
in selectivity for temporary migrants provides suggestive evidence that migration in the long 
term may indeed reduce inequalities within the sending communities. 
 
  The structural barriers to integration into urban society and the economic and 
psychological security offered by the home villages cause temporary migrants to maintain strong 
linkage with the source communities through remittances and return (R. Murphy, 2002). Rural–
urban migrants remit around 200 billion to 250 billion RMB (around US$25–30 billion) back to 
their families in the countryside, which is more than half of the central government’s budget on 
agricultural development (Qiang Li et al., 2008). A national representative survey in 2004 by the 
National Statistical Bureau shows that seasonal migrants account for 20 percent of the total 
rural–urban migrants. Small-scale household surveys show that migration tends to have a 
cyclical character with more than one-third of migrants spending at least three months a year at 
origin counties (Hongyuan Song and Nansheng Bai, 2002). Therefore, the impacts of migration 
on the sending communities are more palpable in China than in other contexts.
6 
 
2.3 Impact of Rural Urban Migration on Migrants
7 
 
The overall impact of internal migration on the migrants themselves and their families in the 
rural areas are generally believed to be positive. Migration is shown to improve consumption and 
income levels and reduce poverty among migrant households.  Most studies find positive impacts 
on education, with some negative impact related to rigid policies. Health outcomes are also 
generally promising, although segmentation and discrimination at the destinations limit the gains. 
                                                 
6 China is one of the few remaining countries that still operates the household registration system and limits the 
integration of migrants into the urban economy. It is in this sense that migrants tend to see the sending communities 
as their home.  
7 For an overview of the rural and urban hukou related inequality, see Human Development Report: China 2007/08 
(http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/nationalreports/asiathepacific/china/China_2008_en.pdf) (UNDP, 2008).    9
Migration often has economic payoffs, but the road is not as rosy as one would like to believe. 
The following aspects of migration are worth our attention. 
   
•  Income gain. Income gain is the first and foremost motive for migrants. In 2004, rural–
urban migrants on the average, earn 780 RMB per month, which is more than three times 
the average income per capita of a typical rural farmer (Research team on the Issue of 
Chinese Farmer-turned Workers, 2006). However, due to labor market segmentation in 
China created by the hukou system, temporary migrants typically move to areas with 
large numbers of low-skilled jobs and become either self-employed or employed in 
dangerous, difficult, and low-paying temporary jobs (e.g., in manufacturing, service, 
construction, and similar jobs), that are not desired by the local residents (X. Meng and J. 
Zhang, 2001). The poverty incidence of migrants is double that of urban residents with 
hukou. 
 
•  Working condition and employment benefits. Low-skilled migrants tend to work in the 
informal sectors that have inadequate labor protection and benefit package. According to 
one survey covering three provinces, migrants’ work hours are 50 percent longer than 
locals while their pay is only 60 percent of their counterparts. Migrants are often hired 
without any written contracts. According to the China Urban Labor Survey, in all work 
units with migrant workers, less than 10 percent of migrant workers are provided with 
old-age social security and medical insurance, while more than two-thirds of their urban 
counterparts enjoy these benefits (Fang Cai, Yang Du and Meiyan Wang, 2009). 
Occupational hazards are high in the mining and construction industries where migrants 
tend to concentrate. Migrants account for 75 percent of all the 11,000 fatalities in 2005 in 
these industries (Quanquan Huang, 2006).  
 
•  Access to services and outcomes. Children who move with their parents tend not to do 
as well as the locals, largely due to their parents' temporary status. They pay additional 
fees yet lack access to the elite schools. The total number of migrant children who lack 
access to education in China is estimated to be 14 to 20 million. Official surveys have 
found drop-out rates at the primary and secondary schools to exceed 9 percent (compared   10
to almost universal for locals). The proportion of those who had never been in school has 
also increased from 0.8 percent to 15.4 percent for ages 8 to 14 and over 60 percent of 
drop-outs aged 12 to 14 had already ventured into child labor (Research team on the Issue 
of Chinese Farmer-turned Workers, 2006). Access to basic health service is limited. Even 
in Shanghai, one of the model cities in terms of providing social service to migrants, only 
two-thirds of migrant children received vaccination in 2004 compared to the universal 
immunization for local children. The occupational health hazard in urban areas is high. 
When they become ill, they may have to move back to the rural areas to receive medical 
treatment owing to the exorbitant health expense in urban hospitals and their lack of 
health insurance.  
 
•  Participation and integration. Many of them have gradually adopted the value system 
of urban society in the way they consume and socialize with people but remain 
marginalized in the destination places owing to institutional barriers epitomized by the 
hukou. Migrant workers in China have few channels to express their interests and to 
protect their rights in the workplace. Seventy-eight percent of the migrants say their work 
units have no trade union, workers’ representative conference, labor supervisory 
committees, or other labor organizations compared to the state of the 22 percent of urban 
workers (Fang Cai and Dewen Wang, 2008). Long-distance migration also hinders the 
expression of their voting rights in their villages. In a survey among migrants in Wuhan 
City, only 20 percent of the migrants confirmed that they have voted in the last village 
election (Zengyang Xu and Huixiang Huang, 2002). 
 
2.4 Impact of Migration on Sending Communities 
 
  There are also many studies on the impact of migration on those left-behind. However, 
these studies tend to take a micro perspective focusing on the effect of migration at the 
household level. The impact on how migration transforms the rural areas, which were isolated 
for more than two decades, has been largely overlooked by the existing literature (R. Murphy, 
2002). This imbalance is what this paper intends to address. In general, rural–urban migration 
has been viewed as positive in China. However, if migration increases inequality in the sending   11
communities among the poor who were left-behind in rural areas, the benefits of migration need 
to be reevaluated. Nonetheless, existing studies find that remittances significantly contribute to 
the sending household’s per capita income and consumption, which in turn reduces poverty. 
Remittances also allow migrants to subsidize the expenditure on schooling and medical care. 
 
•  Consumption and income. Per capita consumption and income are 8.5–17 percent 
higher for households with a rural–urban migrant (Yang Du et al., 2005; Nong Zhu and 
Xuebei Luo, 2008). 
 
•  Poverty Reduction. Among households with a migrant, poverty incidence falls from 28 
percent to 14 percent (Nong Zhu and Xuebei Luo, 2008). However, the effect on 
aggregate poverty (e.g., 1 percent point drop in aggregate poverty) is limited because 
migrants do not come from the poorest households (Yang Du, Albert Park, and Sangui 
Wang, 2005). 
 
•  Education. Many migrants explicitly state that their primary motive is to pay for their 
sibling or children’s education.  However, the separation from one or both of their parents 
can put children at risk due to lack of supervision and interaction with parents. 
Furthermore, high school fees and poor career prospects may deter investments in higher 
levels of school education (A. de Brauw and J. Giles, 2008b).
   
 
•  Health.  Jalan and Ravallion (2001) find that rural households in China are more likely to 
send members to migrate in order to pay for health expenditures. Studies report that 
children left behind are marginally less healthy psychologically than other children 
because of the separation from parents (Biao Xiang, 2005). 
 
•  Inequality. The conventional wisdom is that migration contributes to greater inequality 
in the places of origin because of positive selection (see Zhu and Luo (2008) for a review 
of this literature). However, more recent findings suggest the opposite. Following 
Barham and Boucher (1998), Zhu and Luo (2008) simulated the counterfactual income 
distribution in the absence of migration and remittances, and found that migration   12
reduces the Gini coefficient by 16.7 percent. Moreover, de Brauw and Gils (2008a) 
suggest that out-migration from the village leads to growth in per capita income and 
consumption, and that migrant opportunity is contributing to more rapid economic 
growth among poorer households within villages. This result is consistent with 
ethnographic studies where migration is shown to help promote equality in the natal 
communities because in obtaining resources which exist outside the power-based 
distributional mechanisms of the villages, migrants make the boundaries of stratification 
more fluid (D. Benjamin et al., 2005; R. Murphy, 2000). 
 
3.  Empirical strategy 
This section specifies the system GMM model to test the effect of rural-to-urban migration on 
the income inequality in the sending communities in China by using the panel data at the village 
level. Specifically, the following regression equation will be estimated: 
 
,0 1, 1 2 , 3 , 1, 4 it it it it it i t i t Ineq Ineq Emig Emig X v β βββ β τ η −− =+ + + + + + +                   (1) 
 
where  i  and  t   index village and time period ( 1,..., iI =  and  0,... tT = ), respectively; 
Ineq measures the inequality such as the Gini coefficient, Theil index, or gender wage ratio; 
Emig   is the share of emigrants out of the total labors whose hukou is in the village while 
working outside; X  is a vector of other control variables; τ  and η  are community and time 
fixed effects, respectively; v is an error term; and  ( 0,...,4) j j β = are coefficients to be estimated. 
 
  Note that we have included the lagged inequality in the regression equation because 
aggregate variables such as GDP and inequality are time-persisting which means that they are 
serially correlated over time. Therefore, we are estimating a linear dynamic panel data model. In 
addition, we have included both current emigration and lagged emigration in Equation (1) 
because current emigration and lagged emigration may have different effects on inequality. The 
current migration reflects an immediate effect, while the lagged emigration reflects a more 
accumulated effect of migration with a build-up of migration specific to human capital and 
networks.   13
 
   There are two potential pitfalls in Equation (1), which will bias the ordinary least square 
(OLS) estimates. First, the unobserved community heterogeneities (τ ) may be correlated with 
the other independent variables in the right hand side of this equation, which creates an omitted 
variable bias problem. Second, the "relative deprivation" model (O. Stark and J. E. Taylor, 1991, 
Oded Stark and David E. Bloom, 1985) states that the household's relative position with respect 
to a specific reference group in addition to the household's absolute income serves as strong 
motivation for emigration. Therefore, causality may also go from inequality to emigration 
( , it Emig ). 
 
  In discussing the problem of community heterogeneities, we assume that  , it Emig  is 
exogenous for the moment. Unlike the static model, the fixed effects method could not eliminate 
the inconsistency induced by the community heterogeneities in the dynamic model of Equation 
(1), because  , it v  will correlate with the future value of the regressors due to the presence of the 
lagged dependent variable in the right hand of the regression equation. In other words,  
 
,1 ,1 , , [( )( )] 0 it it it it E Ineq Ineq v v −− − −≠  
 
where  ,1 it Ineq −  and  , it v  are the within the group mean values of  ,1 it Ineq −  and  , it v , respectively. 
 
  Arellano and Bond (1991) developed a difference GMM to deal with this kind of 
community heterogeneities. To illustrate this method clearly, we make a first difference with 
respect to Equation (1), 
 
,1 , 1 2 ,3 , 1 4 , it it it it it i t Ineq Ineq Emig Emig X v β ββ β −− Δ= Δ + Δ + Δ + Δ + Δ                        (2) 
   14
where  Δ   is the operator of the first difference.




,, 1 , , 1
,, 1 , 1 , 1
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[( )( )]
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EI n e qv
E Ineq Ineq v v









It is assumed that (1) error terms ( , it v ) are serial uncorrelated,  ,, cov( , ) 0 it is vv =  if st ≠ ; (2) initial 
condition,  ,0 , () 0 ii t EI n e q v =  for  1 t ≥ , and (3)  , () 0 ii t Ev η = .
9 Under these three assumptions, we 
can derive the moment conditions for the difference GMM method as follows: 
 
,, , , , 1 [ ] [ ( )] 0,         when  0,1,..., 2 is it is it it EI n e q v EI n e q v v s T − Δ= − = = −                     (3) 
Thus, all  , is Ineq ( 0,1,..., 2 st =− ) are valid instruments for  ,1 it Ineq − Δ  in Equation (2). 
 
  We then use a similar method to deal with the second problem, that is, the endogeneity of 
, it Emig   in Equation (1) above. Assuming that there is simultaneity and feedback between 
emigration and inequality in the sending communities, that is,  ,, () 0 it is EE m i gv ≠  for st ≤  and 
,, () 0 it is EE m i gv =  for st > .
10 Under this assumption, the moment condition is 
 
,, , , , 1 [ ] [ ( )] 0,         when  0,1,..., 2 is it is it it EE m i g v EE m i g v v s T − Δ= − = = −                     (4) 
                                                 
8  t η  in Equation (1) is ignored because we assume that all variables in Equation (2) are the deviations from the 
period  mean. 
9 For further discussion, see Arellano and Bond (1991). 
10 It implies that  ,, () 0 it it EE m i gv ≠  and  ,1, () 0 it it EE m i g v − =  in Equation (1).   15
Thus, all  , is Emig (  0,1,..., 2 st =− ) are valid instruments for both  , it Ineq Δ  and  ,1 it Ineq − Δ in 
Equation (2).
11 Therefore, the difference GMM exploits the two sets of moment conditions (3) 
and (4) to estimate Equation (2). 
 
  Blundell and Bond (1998) show that when the time period is short (T  is small) or the 
dependent variable is highly time-persisting ( 1 || β  is close to 1), the standard difference GMM 
suffers from the problem of weak instrumental variables. They label moment conditions such as 
Equations (3) and (4) as moment conditions in differences. In addition to these moment 
conditions in differences, they also exploit another set of moment conditions, which are called 
moment conditions in levels.  
 
  Under the same assumptions discussed above, Blundell and Bond (1998) derive the 
following moment conditions for Equation (1) 
 




,1 , [ ( )] 0,         for  2,3,... it i it E Emig v t T η − Δ+ = =                                     (6) 
 
In other words,  ,1 it Ineq − Δ  and  ,1 it Emig − Δ   are used to instrument  ,1 it Ineq −  and  ,1 it Emig −  in 
Equation (1) for  2 t ≥ , respectively. 
 
  Blundell and Bond (1998) call this the system GMM that estimates Equations (1)-(2) 
simultaneously by exploiting the moment conditions (3)-(6) and demonstrate that the system 
GMM estimators are very robust even in a finite sample. 
                                                 
11  Under the assumption of  ,, () 0 it is EE m i gv ≠  for  st ≤  and  ,, () 0 it is EE m i gv =  for  st > ,  ,1 it Emig −  is  an 
exogenous variable in Equation (1) because  ,1, () 0 it it EE m i g v − = . However,  ,1 it Ineq − Δ   is not an exogenous 
variable in Equation (2) because ,1 , ,1 ,2 , ,1 ( ) [( )( )] it it it it it it E Emig v E Emig Emig v v −− − − ΔΔ = − − , which is 
,1,1 () it it EE m i g v −− −  by manipulation and it is not equal to zero.   16
  In summary, there are several benefits in using the system GMM to estimate the effect of 
emigration on income inequality in the sending communities. First, the unobservable community 
heterogeneities that may affect emigration and income inequality simultaneously are safely 
swept out. Second, the lagged inequality is controlled for in the regression equation. To our best 
knowledge, there is no other study that has treated the lagged income inequality properly when 
estimating the effect of emigration on inequality. Since aggregate time series such as inequality 
often exhibit strong time persistency, it is necessary to control for it when estimating the effect of 
emigration on inequality. Lastly and most importantly, contemporary emigration is validly 
instrumented and the concern of a potential reverse causality running from income inequality to 
contemporary emigration is cleared out in our system GMM framework. Thus, the system GMM 
estimate of the effect of emigration on inequality suggests a causal relationship.
12 
 
4.  Data 
 
We use the Chinese Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS), which is a panel dataset with seven 
survey waves (1989, 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, and 2006).
13 The CHNS is conducted by the 
Carolina Population Center (CPC) at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, The Institute 
of Nutrition and Food Hygiene, and the Chinese Academy of Preventive Medicine. The CHNS 
surveys were conducted by an international team of researchers whose backgrounds include 
nutrition, public health, sociology, Chinese studies, demography, and economics. The CPC 
expended considerable effort in staff training and quality control to ensure that the data are of 
high quality.  
 
  The survey was conducted at both the community and household levels. A community 
refers to a village in a rural area or a neighborhood in an urban area. It is the basic level of 
China's administrative hierarchy. The survey sampled communities, which were randomly drawn 
in nine provinces of Guangxi, Guizhou, Heilongjiang, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangsu, Liaoning, 
and Shandong. These provinces vary substantially in geography, economic development, public 
                                                 
12 These estimates capture the general equilibrium effects of migration on inequality; including the effects through 
direct remittances, multiplier effects of remittances from the spending of remittances on local non-tradable products 
and services, as well as the network effects (McKenzie and Rapoport, 2007). 
13 We are grateful to the UNC Carolina Population Center for providing the data.   17
resources, and health indicators.
14 A multistage, random cluster process was used to draw the 
sample surveyed in each province. In 1989–1993, there were 190 primary sampling units: 32 
urban neighborhoods, 30 suburban neighborhoods, 32 towns, and 96 rural villages. Since 2000, 
the primary sampling units have increased to 216: 36 urban neighborhoods, 36 suburban 
neighborhoods, 36 towns, and 108 villages.
15 Currently, there are about 4,400 households in the 
survey, with a total of 19,000 individuals.
16 
 
  Between 20 and 35 households were randomly drawn from each community, and the 
CHNS survey covers all the members formally registered in a household or those with permanent 
residence or hukou. The CHNS survey is designed to examine the effects of health, nutrition, and 
family planning policies in China, and collects detailed information on economic, demographic, 
and social characteristics of individuals, households, and communities. 
 
  This dataset provides us a precious and unique opportunity to examine the dynamic 
relationship between migration and inequality. In fact, the CHNS has just issued both 
constructed household and individual income data in longitudinal form on November 11, 2008 
for all the seven waves. Thus, this paper should be one of the first studies that have used the 
CHNS longitudinal income file to conduct economic research. 
 
  We restrict our analysis to the last four waves of the CHNS survey (1997, 2000, 2004, 
and 2006) because it is only in these waves that specific questions on labor migration were asked 
at the household level. A community panel dataset is constructed by aggregating household 
information to the village level, and we eventually have 395 observations from four different 




                                                 
14 Jiangsu, Liaoning, and Shandong are among the richest provinces; Henan and Hunan among the middle, and 
Guangxi and Guizhou are among the poorest. Geographically, Jiangsu, Liaoning, Shandong, and Guangxi are 
coastal regions, while the other provinces are inland regions (Chen and Zhou, 2007). 
15 For further information, see http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/china/design/survey.html 
16 Probably, attrition problems may exist in the CHNS data because aside from households, communities are also 
replaced. However, we find that more than 90 percent of the communities surveyed in 1997 were also surveyed in 
2006. 
17 The system GMM estimation needs at least three waves.   18
  Table 1 presents the summary statistics for the main variables. 
 
•  Inequality. The Gini coefficient and Theil index are calculated using both household 
total income and per capita income from the income module of the household survey. 
We also retain the information on the gender wage ratio from the key informant in 
the community survey as a measure of gender wage disparity in the villages.
18 It is 
shown that the mean value of the Gini coefficient by using the household total 
income in our study period is 0.39. It is highly consistent with the calculated Gini 
coefficient in the rural areas in Gustafsson, Li, and Sicular (2008) study, which 
implies that we are using a representative sample. When we calculated the Gini 
coefficient by using the household per capita income, the Gini coefficient is slightly 
smaller. 
 
•  Emigration. In this paper, we define an emigrant as one whose hukou was in the 
village, while he/she was working or seeking employment outside the village when 
the survey was carried out. In this sense, we are analyzing the effect of temporary 
emigration on the inequality of the sending village because the hukou of these 
emigrants are still in the village.
19 The emigration rate is defined as the ratio of 
emigrants to the total number of labors in the village whose ages are older than 17 
and younger than 60. Table 1 shows that during our study period, there was about 
15.15 percent of the total labor in the village working outside the village on the 
average. Figure 1 shows that emigration rates have increased dramatically during the 
study period from 1997 to 2006. 
 
•  Additional controls. Table 1 also presents the summary statistics for other control 
variables, which are time-varying at the community level. They include demographic 
structural variables such as shares of elder people, young people (younger than 15 
                                                 
18 Although it is difficult to measure the gender wage gap in the rural areas because a lot of females only work 
within the household, the community survey in the CHNS provide the information for both the male and female 
daily wages at the village reported by the village leader. 
19Since a community in the CHNS refers to a village in a rural area or a neighborhood in an urban area and since our 
study only focuses on rural-to-urban migration, the word community level is used interchangeably with village level 
in this paper.   19
years old), the ethic indicator of Han, and the number of people in relation to the 
total population who were born in other provinces, while their hukou was in the 
village; educational compositional variables such as the shares of people with 
different educational attainments. We also include the household per capita income 
(measured in the 2006 constant price) in the regression as a robustness test. 
 
 
5.  Empirical results 
 
This section presents our main empirical results. We first report the estimated effects of 
emigration on the income disparity across households in the sending villages. Secondly, we 
present the estimation results of the effect of emigration on the gender wage gap in the sending 
villages. 
 
5.1  The effect of emigration on income inequality in the sending villages 
 
  Table 2 presents the system GMM estimates of the effects of emigration on the Gini 
coefficient calculated based on household income. As we have discussed in the Empirical 
Strategy section, we used all lagged inequality and all lagged emigration to instrument the 
difference in the lagged inequality, and the differences in emigration and the lagged emigration 
in Equation (2). At the same time, the difference in the lagged inequality and the difference in 
emigration were used to instrument the lagged inequality and emigration in Equation (1). We 
then estimated Equations (1) and (2) simultaneously.
20 
 
  Column (1) includes only the lagged Gini coefficient, contemporary emigration, and 
lagged emigration besides the survey year fixed effects. First of all, it is noted that the estimated 
coefficient on the Gini coefficient is positive and statistically significant at a high level of 1 
percent. It justifies the use of the system GMM model because the dependent variable of the Gini 
coefficient is serially correlated. Thus, omitting the lagged dependent variable of inequality in 
                                                 
20 Note that the number of observations in Tables 2-5 is smaller than that of Table 1. Equation (1), being a dynamic 
equation accounts for this. Thus, one wave of observations is not counted. In addition, GMM estimation requires 
that a village appears at least three sequential times in the waves (1997, 2000, 2004, and 2006).    20
Equation (1) will necessarily result in the problem of omitted variables, and the usual fixed 
effects estimates will be biased. The test result of the Arellano-Bound test for the first-order 
serial correlation further substantiates the necessity of using the system GMM model because the 
null hypothesis of no first-order serial correlation is statistically rejected at a high level of 1 
percent.
21 In addition, the estimated coefficient on the Gini coefficient is 0.39, or less than 1. It 
means that the economic pattern of inequality follows a standard conditional convergence. 
 
  Second, we found that the estimated coefficient on the current emigration was positive. 
Although it is statistically insignificant, the t-statistic of the estimated coefficient on current 
emigration is larger than 1. On the contrary, the estimated coefficient on the lagged emigration is 
negative and it is statistically at a high level of 5 percent. It is interesting to find that the positive 
effect of current emigration and the negative effect of the lagged emigration on inequality is just 
consistent with the inverted U-shaped effect of emigration on inequality (David McKenzie and 
Hillel Rapoport, 2007). 
 
  One may wonder whether the insignificance of the current migration variable and the 
opposite signs of the current and lagged migrations result from the high correlation (0.67 with a 
p-value less than 0.01) between the current and lagged migrations. In Tables A1 and A2 in the 
Appendix, we report the GMM estimates for specifications with current and lagged migrations 
entering the regressions separately. The coefficients of the current (lagged) migration remain 
positive (negative) and statistically insignificant (significant). Thus, the high correlation is not 
the main reason for the results. As discussed before, the current migration reflects the immediate 
effect of migration, which is likely to be small. On the other hand, the lagged migration reflects a 
more accumulated effect of migration with a build-up of migrant specific human capital and 
networks. Thus, it is not surprising that the lagged migration has a much larger effect than the  
current migration. 
 
                                                 
21 Since we only have four waves of observations, the Arellano-Bond test for second-order serial correlation could 
not be carried out.   21
  Finally, we further conduct a Hansen overidentification test to examine the validity of the 




  Columns (2)-(5) of Table 2 sequentially add other variables to control for the 
demographic and educational differences across villages. It is shown that the estimated positive 
effect of the current migration and the estimated negative effect of the lagged migration on 
income inequality are strongly robust to the inclusion of these control variables. Neither the 
magnitudes nor the standard errors of the estimated coefficients on both contemporary 
emigration and lagged emigration have changed substantially after controlling for these 
demographic and educational variables. 
 
  In terms of the control variables, the share of old people tends to increase the income 
inequality, while the share of young people tends to decrease the income inequality. Compared 
with the omitted baseline group, the share of illiterate or semi-illiterate people, the shares of 
primary school-educated, middle school-educated, and other higher level-educated people tend to 
decrease income inequality. However, all these demographic and educational variables are 
insignificant in the inequality equation. The reason may be that there is insufficient change 
across the time within a village during our study period, although emigration behavior has 
experienced a substantial change, which is illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
  Column (6) of Table 2 includes the per capita income. It is shown that per capita income 
increases the income inequality at the village level although the estimated coefficient is 
statistically insignificant. However, caution should be exercised in interpreting the effect of per 
capita income on income inequality because inequality can simultaneously affect economic 
growth and per capita income (A. V. Banerjee and E. Duflo, 2003; K. J. Forbes, 2000). Since this 
paper focuses on the relationship between emigration and inequality and there is no good 
                                                 
22 The Hansen test is a test of overidentification restrictions, which allow for heteroscedasticity robust standard 
errors. The joint null hypothesis is that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the structural 
growth equation, and the structural equation is correctly specified. Under the null, the test statistic is 
asymptotically distributed as chi-squared with the degree of freedom equal to the number of overidentification 
restrictions. For further discussion, see Hayashi, F. Econometrics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000.   22
instrument for per capita income, we included it in the inequality equation only as a robustness 
check. 
 
  In Table 3, we calculate the Gini coefficient based on the per capita income and use it as 
the dependent variable. It is found that the estimation results and test results in Table 3 are very 
similar to those in Table 2. In addition, the estimated coefficients on the contemporary 
emigration are marginally significant in Columns (1)-(4), and become statistically significant at 
the level of 5 percent in the last two columns. This finding further confirms the inverse U-shaped 
relationship between emigration and inequality. 
 
  Although the Gini coefficient is perhaps the most popular measure of inequality in the 
past years, it possesses many undesirable properties (A. Deaton, 1997).
23 Thus, we replace the 
Gini coefficient with the Theil index, another popular measure of inequality in practice, and 
repeat the exercises in Tables 2-3. The results of the Theil index, as the dependent variable, are 
reported in Tables 4-5. We find that the estimated inverted U-shaped relationship between 
emigration and income inequality is robust to different measures of inequality. Specifically, the 
estimated coefficients on the contemporary emigration are consistently positive in all the 
specifications of Tables 4-5, and they are statistically significant at the level of 10 percent in 
Table 5. In contrast, the estimated coefficients on the lagged emigration are consistently negative 
and statistically significant, at least at the level of 10 percent in all the specifications of Tables 4-
5. 
 
5.2  The effect of emigration on the gender wage gap in the sending villages 
 
Tables 6-7 report the fixed effects estimates of the effect of emigration on the gender wage gap 
in the sending villages. Before discussing the empirical results, it should be noted that we have 
also performed the GMM estimation for the gender wage gap equation. In contrast to the 
regression results of the income inequality equation (Tables 2-5), it is found that the lagged 
gender wage gap is insignificant in the regression equation. In addition, the Arellano-Bond test 
                                                 
23 For example, economies with similar incomes and the Gini coefficients can still have very different income 
distributions. The ability of the Lorenz curves to have different shapes and yet still yield the same Gini coefficient is 
the reason.   23
results for the first-order serial correlation show that the null of the no first-order serial 
correlation is not rejected. 
24 Thus, there is no need to use the dynamic model of GMM, and a 
static panel model such as fixed effects estimation is sufficient. 
 
  Unlike in the GMM estimation, we have no valid instrument for contemporary 
emigration. Since contemporary emigration is a possible endogenous variable, Table 6 only 
includes the lagged emigration as an interested independent variable aside from the other control 
variables. It is interesting to find that the estimated coefficients on the lagged emigration are 
consistently negative and statistically significant at least at the 10 percent level in all the 
specifications of Table 6. It implies that emigration decreases the gender wage gap in the long 
run.  
 
  We have also included the gender ratio of emigrants (measured by the share of males out 
of the total emigrants) in the gender wage gap equation to detect whether the gender composition 
of emigrants has an effect on the gender wage gap. It is found that the coefficients on gender 
ratio become statistically significant. The sign of the coefficients on the gender ratio is positive, 
which is consistent with the demand–supply story. When the gender ratio of emigrants is high, 
more men migrate, thus few men remain in the source regions. Consequently, the high wage for 
men results in a large gender wage gap. However, even while controlling for gender ratio, the 
negative effect of migration on the gender wage gap still holds. 
 
  Although we do not have a convincing instrument for the contemporary emigration, it is 
interesting to see what happens when we include it into the regression equation to test for 
robustness. In addition, unlike the income inequality equation in which income inequality is one 
of the driving forces for emigration, the reversal effect of the gender wage gap on contemporary 
emigration does not seem to be so obvious.  Table 7 reports the results when we include both the 
current and lagged emigration in the gender wage gap equation. It is found that the estimated 
coefficients on the contemporary emigration are consistently positive although they are 
statistically insignificant. At the same time, the estimated coefficients on the lagged emigration 
are consistently negative and they are statistically significant. 
                                                 
24 These results are available upon requests.   24
  Thus, similar to the relationship between emigration and income inequality, the 
relationship between emigration and gender wage gap also seems to have an inverse U-shaped. 
This inverse U-shaped relationship between emigration and the gender wage gap is consistent 
with the Fan and Sun's (2009) finding. Fan and Sun (2009) find that earlier emigrants in the 1990 
census are male-biased while the later emigrants in the 2000 census are more gender-neutral.  
6.  Conclusion and discussion 
Migration and inequality have a complex and intimate relationship. It is widely believed that 
income inequality between the source and destination areas is one of the most important factors 
driving economic migration within and across borders. In contrast to this consensus in the 
literature, existing studies on the impact of migration on income inequality are scarce and the 
results are less unequivocal.  
 
  Although researchers have long contemplated the Kuznets pattern between migration and 
inequality in the sending communities – that is, inequality rises in the beginning of the migration 
process and drops after migration becomes more established –  the literature has little to offer in 
terms of solid empirical evidence. Earlier studies treated remittance income as an exogenous 
transfer, and compared income inequality with and without the inclusion of remittance income. 
More recently, remittances are treated as a potential substitute for home earnings and the 
observed income distribution with remittances are compared to a counterfactual scenario in 
which no migration takes place but includes an imputed level of home earnings. Although the 
earlier approach is unrealistic in assuming that remittance-earning migrants are separate entities 
from their households in rural areas, the improvement that the counterfactual model provides is 
limited because the selection into migration is difficult, if not impossible, to model. In addition to 
these methodological challenges, the usefulness of earlier literature is also tempered by the cross-
section nature and small sample sizes of the sources of their data. The lack of panel data at the 
community level seriously limits the researchers’ ability to quantify the temporal dimension of 
migration and inequality. 
 
  The massive wave of rural urban migrants in China since its reform in 1980s provides a 
unique context to test the relationship between migration and inequality at the community level. 
The massive wave of migration of rural laborers to urban centers is estimated to result in 278   25
million increase in the urban population from 1979 to 2003 (Xianghu Lu and Yonggang Wang, 
2006). However, the majority remains as temporary migrants. The structural barriers for 
integration into the urban society and the economic and psychological security offered by the 
home villages cause temporary migrants to maintain strong linkage with the source communities 
through remittances and return (R. Murphy, 2002). Therefore, the impact of migration on the 
sending communities is more palpable than in the other contexts. Moreover, there are pieces of 
evidence that selectivity for temporary migrants in particular has declined based on the 1990 and 
2000 Census data (Cindy Fan and Mingjie Sun, forthcoming). This decline in selectivity for 
temporary migrants provides suggestive evidence that migration in the long term has the 
potential to reduce inequalities within the sending communities.  
 
  This paper analyzes the impact of rural-to-urban migration on inequality using a newly 
constructed panel for around 100 villages over a ten-year period from 1997 to 2006 in China. To 
our best knowledge, this is the first paper that examines the dynamic aspects of migration and 
income inequality using a panel data analysis. Unlike earlier studies focusing exclusively on 
remittances, our data take into account the total labor earnings of migrants in destination areas. 
Furthermore, we also look at the gender dimension of the impact of migration on wage inequality 
within the sending communities. 
 
  Since income inequality is time-persisting, we used a system GMM framework to control 
for the lagged income inequality in estimating the effect of emigration on income inequality in 
the sending villages. At the same time, contemporary emigration is instrumented in the GMM 
framework because of the unobserved time-varying community shocks that correlate with 
emigration and income inequality and potential reverse causality from income inequality to 
emigration. We found a Kuznets (inverse U-shaped) pattern between migration and income 
inequality in the sending communities. Specifically, contemporary emigration increases income 
inequality while lagged emigration has strong income inequality-reducing effect in the sending 
villages. A 50-percent increase in the lagged emigration rate translates into one-sixth to one-
seventh standard deviation reduction in income inequality. Contemporary emigration has slightly 
smaller effects in resolving the income inequality within the villages. These effects are robust to 
the different specifications and different measures of inequality. More interestingly, the   26
estimated relationship between emigration and the gender wage gap also has an inverse U-shape. 
Emigration tends to increase the gender wage gap initially, and then decrease it in the sending 
villages. 
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Figure 1: Emigration rates in rural China (1997–2006) 
 
Data source: CHNS data (1997, 2002, 2004, 2006) 
 
Note: The emigration rate is defined as the share of population (older than 17 and younger than 
60) to the total labor force in the village who work outside the village where their hukou is 
registered.   30
Table 1: Summary statistics for the main variables 
Variable Obs Mean  Std.  Dev.
  
Dependent variables   
Gini coefficient (household total income)  395 0.3890   0.0975 
Gini coefficient (household per capita 
income)  395 0.3717   0.0985 
Theil index (household total income)  395 0.2921   0.1776 
Theil index (household per capita income)  395 0.2640   0.1707 
Gender wage gap (ln(male wage)-ln(female 
wage))  352 0.2713 0.2817
  
Interested independent variable   
Emigration: 395 15.1536    13.1922 
Share of working outside the village in total 
labor (%)   
   
Control variables   
Share of elder people (age>64) (%)  395 8.9466   5.9216 
Share of young people (age<15) (%)  395 15.6382   6.7367 
Share of Han (%)  395 89.7811   25.3118 
Share of people born in other provinces (%)  395 2.9352   6.1644 
Share of illiterate or semi-illiterate people (%)  395 25.1617   14.9757 
Share of primary-educated people only (%)  395 23.2928   11.0782 
Share of middle school-educated people only 
(%)  395 34.3526   11.4260 
Share of high school and higher-educated 
people (%)  395 17.0885   16.6549 
Household per capita income (RMB/2006)  395 4638.0340   2872.3160 
 
         Data source: CHNS data (1997, 2002, 2004, 2006) 
 
         Notes: Sample is restricted to rural communities 
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Table 2: System GMM estimates of the effects of emigration on income inequality in rural China 
  Dependent variable: Gini coefficient (Household total income) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 












income)(t-1)  (0.116) (0.114) (0.115) (0.112) (0.110) (0.107) 
ln  (%  Emigration)  0.018 0.019 0.020 0.020 0.017 0.018 
  (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
ln (% Emigration)(t-1)  -0.025** -0.026** -0.026** -0.026** -0.028**  -0.027**
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) 
ln [% Old (age>64)]    0.013  0.013  0.013  0.012  0.014 
    (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) 
ln [% Young (age<15)]    -0.018  -0.019  -0.019  -0.019  -0.016 
    (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) 
ln (% Han)      -0.009  -0.009  -0.007  -0.008 
    (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
ln (% Born in other        0.000  0.001  -0.000 
provinces)     (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009) 
ln  (%  Primary)      -0.005  -0.005 
      (0.016)  (0.017) 
ln (% Middle school)          -0.001  -0.001 
      (0.015)  (0.015) 
ln (% Higher education)          -0.006  -0.008 
      (0.009)  (0.009) 
ln  (per  capita  income)       0.014 
(RMB at year 2006)            (0.016) 
        
Wave  2000  -0.024 -0.012 -0.011 -0.011 -0.015 -0.010 
  (0.024) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.030) (0.029) 
Wave 2004  -0.040** -0.037** -0.036** -0.036** -0.037**  -0.035**
  (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) 
H a n s e n         
overidentification test  15.55 16.86 16.92 16.91 15.87 15.76 
P-values  0.556 0.464 0.460 0.461 0.533 0.541 
Arellano-Bond  test  for        
First-order serial 
correlation 
-2.919 -3.104 -3.109 -3.120 -3.041 -3.277 
P-values  0.004 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 
        
Observations  238 238 238 238 238 238 
Number  of  villages 95 95 95 95 95 95 
 
Robust standard errors clustered at community level in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; Survey years (dummies) are included in all 
specifications. 
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Table 3: System GMM estimates of the effects of emigration on income inequality in rural China 
  Dependent variable: Gini coefficient (Per capita income) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Gini  (Per  capita  income  0.192* 0.199* 0.197* 0.207* 0.204* 0.205* 
income)(t-1)  (0.110) (0.109) (0.110) (0.107) (0.108) (0.107) 
ln  (%  Emigration)  0.022 0.022 0.021 0.024 0.024*  0.025* 
  (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
ln (% Emigration)(t-1)  -0.024*  -0.024*  -0.026** -0.027** -0.027**  -0.027**
  (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
ln [% Old (age>64)]    0.003  0.002  0.001  0.002  0.003 
    (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
ln [% Young (age<15)]    -0.007  -0.007  -0.009  -0.009  -0.008 
    (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) 
ln (% Han)      -0.011  -0.011  -0.012  -0.012 
    (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009) 
ln (% Born in other        0.007  0.007  0.007 
provinces)     (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
ln  (%  Primary)      0.006  0.006 
      (0.019)  (0.019) 
ln (% Middle school)          0.011  0.011 
      (0.016)  (0.016) 
ln (% Higher education)          0.002  0.002 
      (0.008)  (0.009) 
ln  (per  capita  income)       0.004 
(RMB at year 2006)            (0.018) 
        
Wave  2000  -0.040*  -0.035 -0.037 -0.035 -0.037 -0.036 
  (0.022) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.029) 
Wave 2004  -0.038** -0.037** -0.038** -0.040** -0.042**  -0.041**
  (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) 
H a n s e n         
overidentification test  15.37 16.30 16.01 16.10 16.38 16.42 
P-values  0.569 0.503 0.523 0.517 0.497 0.494 
Arellano-Bond  test  for        
First-order serial 
correlation 
-2.986 -3.057 -3.076 -3.040 -3.101 -3.123 
P-values  0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
        
Observations  238 238 238 238 238 238 
Number  of  villages 95 95 95 95 95 95 
 
Robust standard errors clustered at community level in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; Survey years (dummies) are included in all 
specifications. 
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Table 4: System GMM estimates of the effects of emigration on income inequality in rural China 
  Dependent variable: Theil index (Household total income) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 














income)(t-1)  (0.128) (0.126) (0.126) (0.123) (0.120) (0.116) 
ln  (%  Emigration)  0.037 0.038 0.039 0.041 0.030 0.034 
  (0.034) (0.035) (0.033) (0.034) (0.031) (0.031) 
ln  (%  Emigration)(t-1)  -0.054* -0.054* -0.055* -0.055* -0.062* -0.059* 
  (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.035) (0.033) 
ln [% Old (age>64)]    0.010  0.010  0.009  0.005  0.010 
    (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
ln [% Young (age<15)]    -0.035  -0.036  -0.038  -0.036  -0.027 
    (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.027) (0.028) 
ln (% Han)      -0.011  -0.011  -0.006  -0.007 
    (0.015)  (0.016)  (0.014)  (0.014) 
ln (% Born in other        0.005  0.007  0.003 
Provinces)     (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.015) 
ln  (%  Primary)      -0.022  -0.021 
      (0.033)  (0.035) 
ln (% Middle school)          -0.012  -0.011 
      (0.029)  (0.031) 
ln (% Higher education)          -0.022  -0.025 
      (0.018)  (0.020) 
ln  (per  capita  income)       0.043 
(RMB at year 2006)            (0.037) 
        
Wave  2000  -0.048 -0.028 -0.028 -0.025 -0.038 -0.022 
  (0.050) (0.058) (0.060) (0.059) (0.065) (0.057) 
Wave 2004  -0.079** -0.073** -0.073** -0.074** -0.076*  -0.070* 
  (0.034) (0.035) (0.036) (0.037) (0.040) (0.037) 
H a n s e n         
overidentification test  12.75 13.58 13.55 13.48 13.25 12.99 
P-values  0.753 0.697 0.698 0.704 0.719 0.737 
Arellano-Bond  test  for        
First-order serial 
correlation 
-2.098 -2.227 -2.237 -2.222 -2.070 -2.505 
P-values  0.036 0.026 0.025 0.026 0.038 0.012 
        
Observations  238 238 238 238 238 238 
Number  of  villages 95 95 95 95 95 95 
 
Robust standard errors clustered at community level in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; Survey years (dummies) are included in all 
specifications. 
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Table 5: System GMM estimates of the effects of emigration on income inequality in rural China 
 
 Dependent  variable:  Theil  index (Per capita income) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Theil  index  (Per  capita    0.199 0.196 0.197 0.203 0.189 0.191 
income)(t-1)  (0.140) (0.140) (0.140) (0.135) (0.137) (0.134) 
ln  (%  Emigration)  0.048* 0.049* 0.046* 0.049* 0.043* 0.045* 
  (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.024) (0.024) 
ln  (%  Emigration)(t-1)  -0.048* -0.048* -0.051* -0.052* -0.057* -0.055* 
  (0.028) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.032) (0.031) 
ln [% Old (age>64)]    0.005  0.004  0.003  0.003  0.006 
    (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
ln [% Young (age<15)]    -0.021  -0.019  -0.022  -0.020  -0.014 
    (0.026) (0.027) (0.028) (0.025) (0.026) 
ln (% Han)      -0.010  -0.009  -0.009  -0.010 
    (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.015) 
ln (% Born in other        0.008  0.009  0.007 
provinces)     (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.014) 
ln  (%  Primary)      -0.001  -0.001 
      (0.035)  (0.036) 
ln (% Middle school)          0.011  0.012 
      (0.028)  (0.029) 
ln (% Higher education)          -0.011  -0.013 
      (0.018)  (0.020) 
ln  (per  capita  income)       0.028 
(RMB at year 2006)            (0.036) 
        
Wave  2000  -0.068 -0.056 -0.061 -0.058 -0.072 -0.060 
  (0.046) (0.053) (0.054) (0.054) (0.060) (0.056) 
Wave  2004  -0.063* -0.059* -0.061* -0.063* -0.069* -0.064 
  (0.035) (0.036) (0.037) (0.038) (0.041) (0.040) 
H a n s e n         
overidentification test  13.95 14.83 14.53 14.73 14.18 14.14 
P-values  0.671 0.608 0.629 0.615 0.654 0.657 
Arellano-Bond  test  for        
First-order serial 
correlation 
-1.622 -1.639 -1.649 -1.638 -1.638 -1.697 
P-values  0.105 0.101 0.099 0.101 0.101 0.090 
        
Observations  238 238 238 238 238 238 
Number  of  villages 95 95 95 95 95 95 
 
Robust standard errors clustered at community level in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; Survey years (dummies) are included in all 
specifications. 
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Table 6: Fixed effects estimates of the effects of emigration on the gender wage gap in rural 
China 
  Dependent variable: ln (male wage) - ln (female wage) 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ln (% Emigration)(t-1)  -
0.055* 
-0.054* -0.055* -0.047  -0.055* -0.060** 
 (0.028
) 
(0.029) (0.029) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) 









(0.070) (0.070) (0.065) (0.055) (0.057) 
ln  [%  Old(age>64)]    -0.002 -0.002 -0.009 -0.002 -0.012 
    (0.041) (0.041) (0.043) (0.041) (0.035) 
ln  [%  Young  (age<15)]    0.010 0.015 0.028 0.026 0.004 
    (0.060) (0.060) (0.065) (0.059) (0.056) 
ln (% Han)      0.088  0.073  0.070  0.071 
     (0.125)  (0.118)  (0.108)  (0.125) 
ln (% Born in other        -0.046  -0.044  -0.051 
rovinces)        (0.034) (0.030) (0.028) 
ln (% Primary)          -0.045  -0.065 
       (0.094)  (0.093) 
ln (% Middle school)          -0.188  -0.180 
       (0.161)  (0.154) 
ln (% Higher education)          -0.086  -0.078 
       (0.116)  (0.111) 
ln  (per  capita  income)        -0.110 
(RMB at year 2006)            (0.063) 
         
Observations  219  219 219 219 219 218 
Number  of  villages  94  94 94 94 94 93 
R-squared  0.05  0.05 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.10 
 
Robust standard errors clustered at community level in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; Survey years (dummies) are included in all 
specifications. 
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Table 7: Fixed effects estimates of the effects of emigration on the gender wage gap in rural 
China 
  Dependent variable: ln (male wage) - ln (female wage) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ln  (%  Emigration)  -0.023 -0.024 -0.024 -0.023 -0.024 -0.011 
 (0.053)  (0.053)  (0.054)  (0.051) (0.055) (0.061) 
Male migrants / female 
migrants 
0.031 0.032 0.032 0.077 0.066 0.056 
 (0.084)  (0.084)  (0.084)  (0.102) (0.101) (0.100) 
ln  (%  Emigration)(t-1)  -0.055* -0.055* -0.055* -0.046  -0.058* -0.062* 
 (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.027) (0.029) (0.030) 














(t-1) (0.063)  (0.064)  (0.064) (0.063) (0.052) (0.053) 
ln [% Old(age>64)]    -0.006  -0.007  -0.011  -0.003  -0.014 
    (0.046) (0.046) (0.048) (0.046) (0.039) 
ln [% Young (age<15)]    -0.013  -0.008  0.004  -0.001  -0.022 
    (0.064) (0.066) (0.071) (0.061) (0.057) 
ln  (%  Han)      0.083 0.068 0.066 0.066 
      (0.115) (0.117) (0.108) (0.127) 
ln (% Born in other        -0.051  -0.047  -0.054 
provinces)     (0.035)  (0.032)  (0.031) 
ln  (%  Primary)      -0.043  -0.056 
      (0.113)  (0.109) 
ln (% Middle school)          -0.180  -0.170 
      (0.186)  (0.176) 
ln (% Higher education)          -0.087  -0.079 
      (0.130)  (0.123) 
ln  (per  capita  income)       -0.112 
(RMB  at  year  2006)      (0.077) 
        
Observations  211 211 211 211 211 210 
Number  of  villages  93 93 93 93 93 92 
R-squared  0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.10 
 
Robust standard errors clustered at community level in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; Survey years (dummies) are included in all 
specifications. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: System GMM estimates of the effects of emigration on income inequality in rural 
China (lagged emigration only) 
  Dependent variable: Gini coefficient (Household total income) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 












income)(t-1)  (0.115) (0.113) (0.113) (0.111) (0.108) (0.106) 
ln (% Emigration)(t-1)  -0.025*  -0.027** -0.026*  -0.026*  -0.029**  -0.028**
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) 
ln [% Old (age>64)]    0.012  0.012  0.012  0.011  0.012 
    (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) 
ln [% Young (age<15)]    -0.008  -0.009  -0.009  -0.013  -0.011 
    (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) 
ln (% Han)      -0.010  -0.010  -0.008  -0.009 
    (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
ln (% Born in other        -0.003  -0.001  -0.002 
provinces)     (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
ln  (%  Primary)      -0.002  -0.002 
      (0.015)  (0.016) 
ln (% Middle school)          -0.009  -0.010 
      (0.016)  (0.016) 
ln (% Higher education)          -0.010  -0.011 
      (0.009)  (0.009) 
ln  (per  capita  income)       0.009 
(RMB at year 2006)            (0.016) 
        
Wave  2000  -0.031 -0.027 -0.025 -0.025 -0.027 -0.023 
  (0.023) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.026) 










  (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) 
H a n s e n         
overidentification test  14.81 15.65 15.63 15.69 15.12 15.03 
P-values  0.675 0.617 0.619 0.614 0.654 0.660 
Arellano-Bond  test  for        
First-order serial 
correlation 
-2.883 -3.012 -2.987 -3.049 -2.907 -3.094 
P-values  0.004 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.002 
        
Observations  249 249 249 249 249 249 
Number  of  villages 98 98 98 98 98 98 
Robust standard errors clustered at community level in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; Survey years (dummies) are included in all 
specifications.   38
Table A2: System GMM estimates of the effects of emigration on income inequality in rural 
China (contemporary emigration only) 
  Dependent variable: Gini coefficient (Household total income) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 












income)(t-1)  (0.102) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.099) (0.098) 
ln  (%  Emigration)  0.015 0.015 0.013 0.012 0.013 0.014 
  (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) 






    (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
ln [% Young (age<15)]    -0.018  -0.018  -0.017  -0.015  -0.011 
    (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
ln (% Han)      0.003  0.002  -0.001  -0.002 
    (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.007) 
ln (% Born in other        -0.002  -0.002  -0.003 
provinces)     (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
ln  (%  Primary)      -0.004  -0.004 
      (0.012)  (0.013) 
ln (% Middle school)          0.024**  0.024** 
      (0.010)  (0.010) 
ln (% Higher education)          0.004  0.003 
      (0.007)  (0.008) 
ln  (per  capita  income)       0.014 
(RMB at year 2006)            (0.013) 
        
Wave  2000  0.028 0.025 0.026 0.026 0.021 0.019 
  (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Wave  2004  0.011  -0.003 -0.001 0.000  -0.004 -0.008 
  (0.021) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) 
Wave  2006  0.035 0.019 0.021 0.022 0.018 0.013 
  (0.024) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.028) (0.029) 
H a n s e n         
overidentification test  20.07 21.65 21.74 21.89 21.28 21.03 
P-values  0.638 0.541 0.536 0.527 0.564 0.579 
Arellano-Bond  test  for        
First-order serial 
correlation 
-3.771 -3.663 -3.693 -3.728 -3.732 -3.874 
P-values  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
        
Observations  327 327 327 327 327 327 
Number  of  villages 98 98 98 98 98 98 
Robust standard errors clustered at community level in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; Survey years (dummies) are included in all 
specifications. 